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I.

INTRODUCTION

The "purchase-seller requirement," which has been one of the most
significant limitations placed upon the development of the implied liabilities of Rule 10b-5, arose in 1952 in the renowned decision of the
Second Circuit, Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.' Especially since
1967, this limitation on standing frequently called the Birnbaum Doctrine, has been the object of such extensive academic,2 administrative,'
and judicial' criticism, that its status in the law has remained uncertain.
The purpose of this comment is to re-examine the Birnbaum Doctrine
in the light, however opaque, of certain recent decisions.
* This article attempts to summarize the state of the law on the purchaser-seller requirement in actions brought under rule 10b-5 as of August 1, 1970. Since the law on this
question is currently in a state of flux, the interested reader should be certain to consult
the most current decisions. Some of the relevant cases decided subsequent to the completion
of this comment appear below. See e.g., Cooper v. Garza, 431 F.2d 578 (5th Cir. 1970);
Erling v. Powell, No. 19,780 (8th Cir. July 29, 1970); Herpich v. Wallace, No. 27,729,
(5th Cir. July 14, 1970).
** Student Writing Editor, University of Miami Law Review; Student Instructor,
Freshman Research and Writing.
1. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 956 (1952). The purchaser-seller
requirement has been treated by many courts as an element of the plaintiff's standing to
sue; a term the courts have apparently borrowed from the phraseology of constitutional
law.
2. See LowenfeIs, The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for 10b-5, 54
VA. L. REv. 268 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Lowenfels]. Comment, The Purchaser-Seller
Limitation to SEC Rule 10b-5, 53 CORNELL L. REv. 684 (1968). See also, Leech, Transactions in CorporateControl, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 725, 832-35 (1956).
3. The SEC, as amicus curiae has argued that the Birnbaum doctrine was not required
by the language of § 10(b). See A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 397 & n.3 (2d
Cir. 1967); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 633, 635 & n.6 (2d Cir. 1967).
4. See Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), noted in 42 N.Y.U. L. REv.
978 (1967).
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II. HISTORY
Since 1946 courts have construed rule lOb-5 5 as providing an implied
private right of civil recovery for its violation.' Private civil actions
instituted under this rule have given birth to an important body of
judge-made federal law of corporations. 7 The extraordinary expansion
of the subject matter coverage of rule lOb-5, coupled with the possibility
of very substantial liability, has moved the courts to limit the class of
persons who have standing to sue for violations of rule 10b-5.
In Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.,8 certain minority stockholders,
suing on behalf of the corporation and all stockholders similarly situated,
alleged that the president and controlling stockholder had rejected a
merger which would have been highly profitable for all the stockholders,
in favor of a sale of only his controlling interest at a premium over
market value. The plaintiffs contended that the sale, together with
certain misrepresentations made to facilitate it, constituted fraudulent
practices in connection with the purchase and sale of securities within
the meaning of rule lOb-5. The district court dismissed the complaint.
5. Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1967), was promulgated under § 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 891 (1964), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964). Section
10 provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of
any national securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
which would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
6. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) See also the
discussion of the theories on which implied liability rests and the authorities collected in
A. BROMBERG, SECURITiEs LAws: FRAu--SEC RULE 10B-5 (1969); 3 L. Loss, SEcuarrms
REGULATrON 1763 (1969 ed); Fleischer, Federal Corporation Law: An Assessment, 78
HARV. L. REV. 1146 (1965); Klein, The Extension of a Private Remedy to Defrauded
Securities Investors Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 20 U. MiAm L. Rv. 81 (1965); Painter,
Inside Information: Growing Pains for the Development of Federal CorporationLaw Under
Rule lob-5, 65 CoLum. L. REv. 1361 (1965); Ruder, Pitfalls in the Development of a
Federal Law of Corporation by Implication Through Rule 10b-5, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 185
(1964); Comment, The Prospects for Rule X-lOb-5: An Emerging Remedy for Defrauded
Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120 (1950).
7. See Fleischer, Federal Corporation Law: An Assesment, 78 HARv. L. REv. 1146
(1965).
8. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952).
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The question raised before the Second Circuit was whether a plaintiff
who neither sold nor purchased could assert a claim under rule 10b-5.
In answering this question, the court explained that rule 10b-5 was
adopted to make the prohibitions contained in section 17(a) of the 1933
Act' applicable to purchasers as well as sellers and therefor the language
"inconnection with the purchase or sale of any security" should be
construed as limiting standing to sue to buyers or sellers of securities.
This rigid purchaser-seller requirement, though adhered to by
the courts,' ° was criticized by the commentators" and the SEC as too
strict a reading of the rule.'"
III.

"DEATH"

AND RESURRECTION

A series of Circuit Court cases appeared in 1967 which expressly
avoided deciding the contention that one need not be a purchaser or a
seller to sue under rule lOb-5. These decisions did, however, weaken the
impact of Birnbaum by expanding the definitions of "purchase" and
"sale" so that persons not actually involved in a normal securities
transaction were considered "buyers" or "sellers."'"
In one of these decisions, Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co.,' 4 the
plaintiffs were non-tendering stockholders of a target company which
after a successful tender offer became a party to a short-form merger.
The district court dismissed, relying on Birnbaum and the circuit court
reversed, holding that the short-form merger constituted a "constructive sale" within the meaning of rule 10b-5. 5
Three months later in Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp.,'" the Seventh
Circuit held that a corporation which was fraudulently induced to issue
its own shares in a merger, and which in turn received the shares of
9. 15 U.S.C. § 779 (1954).
10. E.g., Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 90 S. Ct. 2199 (1970) ; Jensen v. Voyles, 393 F.2d 131 (10th Cir. 1968) ; Greater
Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783 (8th Cir. 1967); General Time Corp. v. American
Investors Fund, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); aff'd, 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969); Farraioli v. Cantor, 281 F. Supp. 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Supp. 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
11. Leech, Transactions in CorporateControl, 104 U. PA. L. Rav. 725 (1965); Comment,
Private Enforcement Under Rule lOb-5: An Injunction for a Corporate Insurer?, 115 U.
PA. L. Rav. 618, 622-23 (1967); Comment, The Decline of the Purchaser-Seller Requirement of Rule lOb-5, 14 VJLL. L. Rav. 499, 501-02 (1969).
12. See references to amicus briefs of the SEC in Birnbaum, v. Newport Steel Corp.,
193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 634, 636 (2d Cir.
1967); cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967); A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d
Cir. 1967). Cf. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 337 U.S. 426 (1964).
13. Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1967); A.T. Brod & Co. v.
Perlow, 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967); Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 374 F.2d 627, 634, 636
(2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970 (1967). See also Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339
F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964); Hooper v. Mountain States Sec. Corp., 282 F.2d 195 (5th Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 815 (1961).
14. 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967).
15. Vine v. Beneficial Fin. Corp., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967).
16. 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 977 (1967).
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another corporation, was both a "seller" and a "purchaser" for the
purposes of rule 10b-5.
Meanwhile, in A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 7 wherein the plaintiff
was found to be a purchaser, the language of the court emphasized the
connection which the scheme had with the securities market rather than
the arbitrary rule limiting standing. Moreover, several district court
decisions seemed to indicate that it is unnecessary to prove a consummated purchase or sale of securities as a condition precedent to the
maintenance of a 10b-5 action. 8
These and other similar decisions seem to have led at least one
district judge 9 and several commentators 20 to suggest that Birnbaum
had been effectively emasculated. Their analysis neglected the fact that
in fashioning mitigating doctrines granting standing to plaintiffs by
artificially labelling them "purchasers" or "sellers" of securities, these
courts were tacitly approving the purchaser-seller requirement. More
recent decisions have clearly indicated that these suggestions that
Birnbaum had been emasculated were, at best, premature. 2' In Iroquois
Industries, Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp.,22 the Second Circuit wrote:
Appellant Iroquois and the Commission (as a friend of the
Court) in substance invite us to overrule Birnbaum; they
assert that its reasoning has already been weakened by several
decisions of this Court. We do not so read the decisions and we
do not believe that "the purchaser-seller limitation" of Birnbaum "has been relaxed" by later decisions of this Court, as
the Commission contends.28
In Rekant v. Desser,24 the Fifth Circuit chose more vivid language.
Birnbaum has been shot at by expert marksmen. The buyerseller requirement for standing has been criticized as too strict
a reading of the rule. Commentators have said the [sic] Birnbaum has been significantly eroded in a variety of later cases,
even in the Second Circuit .... Bloody but unbowed, Birnbaum
still stands.
25
17. 375 F.2d 393 (2d Cir. 1967).
18. See, e.g., Commerce Reporting Co. v. Puretec, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 715 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1967). Cf. cases cited in
A. BROMBERG, SEculrIEs LAw: FRAUD-SEC RuILE 10B-5, § 8.8, at 221-22 & n.98 (1968).
19. See Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
20. See, e.g., Lowenfels, supra note 2; Comment, The Purchaser-Seller Limitation to
SEC Rule lob-5, 53 CORNELL L. REv. 684 (1968).
21. Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 90 S. Ct. 2199 (1970); City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 90 S. Ct. 2196 (1970) ; Rekant v. Desser, No. 25872 (5th Cir., Apr. 20,
1970) at 11; Coffee v. Permian, 306 F. Supp. 371 (N.D. Texas 1969) rev'd 434 F.2d 383
(5th Cir. 1970); Greenstein v. Paul, 400 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1968). See also Vanderboom v.
Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir. 1970).
22. 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 90 S. Ct. 2199 (1970).
23. Id. at 967
24. 425 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1970).
25. Id. at 877 (footnotes and citations omitted).
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THE SECOND DEMISE

This recent resurrection of Birnbaum may be more apparent than
real. While the courts in Iroquois and Rekant were correct in minimizing
the effect on Birnbaum of cases like Vine, Brod, and Dasho, they failed
to pay sufficient attention to another series of cases directly challenging
the language of the Birnbaum decision. At least since 1967, the Second
Circuit has consistently mantained that the "purchaser-seller" requirement is not applicable in actions for injunctive relief.26 In Mutual Shares
Corp. v. Genesco, Inc.,2 7 the Second Circuit evaluated the purchaserseller requirement in the context of an action for damages and for an
injunction. The plaintiffs, minority stockholders in S.H. Kress and Co.,
had purchased their stock shortly after Genesco, Inc. had obtained control of Kress through a successful tender offer. They claimed that the
principals of Genesco had, during the tender offer, withheld information
concerning Kress' undervalued real estate, and after obtaining control,
had maintained a low dividend policy in order to purchase shares from
minority stockholders at a depressed value. The plaintiffs sought damages
for the misused assets, liquidation of Kress, and an injunction prohibiting
further manipulation of the stock. The Court dismissed the damage
claims but granted the injunction despite the fact that the plaintiffs were
neither purchasers nor sellers.
The Court wrote:
[W]e do not regard the fact that plaintiffs have not sold their
stock as controlling on the claim for injunctive relief. The complaint alleges a manipulative scheme which is still continuing.
While doubtless the Commission could seek to halt such practices, present stockholders are also logical plaintiffs to play "an
important role in enforcement" of the Act in this way. See Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692, 698 (2d Cir. 1966....
Injunctive relief was considered proper in Ruckle v. Roto American Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964), to restrain the "sale"
of treasury stock by a corporation on the theory that the corporation was a "seller" under Rule 10b-5 although the sale was
not yet consummated.... Deceitful manipulation of the market

price of publicly-owned stock is precisely one of the types of injury to investors at which the Act and the Rule were aimed.
Since private parties have the right to sue for violation of the
Rule, the broad remedial purposes of the Act suggest that the
judicial relief available should not be limited to a particular type
of remedy. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 84 S. Ct.
26. Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co. 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969); Mutual
Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967). See also Greenstein v. Paul,
400 F.2d 580, 581 (2d Cir. 1968); Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417
F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 90 S. Ct. 2199 (1970); Symington Wayne Corp. v.
Dresser Indus. Inc., 383 F.2d 840 (2d Cir. 1967); Ruckle v. Roto Am. Corp., 339 F.2d 24
(2d Cir. 1964).
27. 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967).
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1555, 12 L.Ed. 2d 423 (1964) .... Moreover, as already indicated, the claim for damages on this theory founders both on
proof of loss and the causal connection with the alleged violation of the Rule; on the other hand, the claim for injunctive
relief largely avoids these issues, may cure harm suffered by continuing shareholders, and would afford complete relief against
the Rule 10b-5 violation for the future. "It is not necessary in a
suit for equitable or prophylactic relief to establish all the elements required in a suit for monetary damages." See SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. at 193.... We,
of course, do not know whether plaintiffs can prove their allegations. However, we hold that they have stated a claim under the
Act and Rule 10b-5 for injunctive relief to prevent defendants
from depressing the price of Kress stock by market manipulation or otherwise....
In three recent decisions, the Second, 9 Third, 0 and to a lesser extent, the Fifth Circuit,3 ' have viewed the absence of "purchaser" or
"seller" status, not as an absolute barrier to standing, but rather as an
element in the problem of demonstrating that the alleged fraud caused
the injury. This approach, which originated in Genesco, involves the first
direct challenge to the Birnbaum doctrine by the circuit courts. 82
In Crane v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co.,88 the plaintiff, Crane,
a tender offeror, alleged that a third company, Standard, who had itself
proposed a merger with the target company, Air Brake, had "painted
the tape" in Air Brake stock so as to create a dramatic rise in market
price and thereby deter Air Brake shareholders from tendering to Crane.
The undisputed facts disclosed that on the day Crane's tender offer was
to expire, Standard purchased 170,000 shares of Air Brake on the New
York Stock Exchange at an average cost of $49.50 per share, and secretly sold 100,000 shares off the market and 20,000 shares on the market
at a negotiated price to third parties averaging $44.50 per share. This
resulted in an apparent loss of more than $500,000 on its purchases and
sales for the day. The Crane tender offer was defeated; the StandardAir Brake merger was completed whereby Crane's shares of Air Brake
were exchanged for shares of a new Standard convertible preferred; and
Crane sold most of these shares under threat of a divestiture action to
be brought by Standard under the antitrust laws. In reversing the court
below,3 4 a unanimous Second Circuit panel, including Chief Judge Lum28. Id. at 546-47 (footnotes omitted).
29. Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969).
30. Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, No. 1477 (U.S.
June 8, 1970).
31. Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1970).
32. Cf. Entel v. Allen, 270 F. Supp. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
33. 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969).
34. It should be noted that this case actually involved claims of deceptive proxy statement and illegal vote buying as well as forbidden manipulation and fraud in connection with
the purchase and sale of securities. The main thrust of Crane's case in the lower court was
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bard who had joined in the Iroquois decision, held that Standard, in
concealing from the public, particularly the Air Brake stockholders, the
true situation as to the market price, had violated sections 9(a)(2)85
and 10(b) of the Exchange Act. The case was remanded for a further
determination of the appropriate remedies which, the court noted, may
include damages and prospective injunctive relief as well as restrospective
relief."
The court discussed the problems of standing to sue under both
§ 9(a)(2) and § 10(b) and found that Crane was forced to sell by
Standard's deception and therefore fell within the protection of § 9 (a) (2).
It is clear that Crane was one of the class of persons intended
to be protected by the statute against Standard's violation.
Standard acted for the "purpose of inducing" sale by Crane.
Standard's actions had the intended and inevitable effect of inducing Crane to become a seller within the meaning of section
9(a) (2), for if successful in defeating Crane's tender offer and
consummating the Standard merger, antitrust considerations
would require sale by Crane of the shares held by Crane or
those received in exchange. This placed Crane in a situation
comparable to that of the dissenting shareholders in Vine v.
Beneficial Finance Co., 374 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 970, 88 S. Ct. 463, 19 L.Ed. 2d 460 (1968) for
here as there, plaintiff was forced to become "a seller under the
87
Act."
Based upon the foregoing and other language, it has been argued
that the court allowed Crane standing to sue under rule 10b-5 because
he was a "forced seller."5 8 Although portions of the opinion, if taken
out of context, support that argument,89 this writer cannot agree for the
following statements seem to indicate a contrary view.
in support of the former and as to these claims the lower court's decision was affirmed.
That aspect of the case, however, is not germane to this discussion.
35. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a) (2) (1954) makes it unlawful:
To effect, alone or with one or more other persons, a series of transactions in any
security registered on a national securities exchange creating actual or apparent
active trading in such security or raising or depressing the price of such security,
for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sali of such security by others.
Liability for a violation of section 9(a) (2) is provided by section 9(e):
Any person who wilfully participates in any act or transaction in violation of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section, shall be liable to any person who shall
purchase or sell any security at a price which was affected by such act or transaction, and the person so injured may sue in law or in equity in any court of
competent jurisdiction to recover the damages sustained as a result of any such
act or transaction.
36. Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 803 (2d Cir. 1969).
37. Id. at 794.
38. This was argued by the unsuccessful appellee in Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161,
171 (3d Cir. 1970). See also Hirsch v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 311 F. Supp.
1283 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
39. The present case falls within the rationale of Vine, where we held that a
minority shareholder in a short form merger is a 'seller' since he is entitled only
to cash for his shares. . . . The success of Standard's maneuver made Crane a
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Standard's failure to disclose its manipulation operated as a
fraud and deceit on Crane in connection with the purchase and
sale of securities, creating a right to relief in Crane quite apart
from Crane's rights as a forced seller under section 9(a) (2).4 0
Other language which tends to confirm this writer's position, that
the court found that Crane could sue under 10b-5, not because he was a
"forced seller" but because as a tender offeror, he was in a position to
demonstrate that the alleged violations caused injury, appears below.
When securities are subject to trading dominated by an insider
such as Standard, there is an obligation to disclose material information to the investing public, and this duty gives rise to
liability under 10b-S to third persons who, as a result of the deception practiced upon the public, are prevented from entering
into securities transactions with members of the public. When
Crane entered, the securities market with its tender offer, it was
entitled to the Act's protection not only against being deceived
itself but also against deception of the investing public designed
to prevent the public from entering into securities transactions.
See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 279
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) and supra, at 401 F.2d 848."'
Furthermore, the court specifically discussed questions of standing
under 10b-5. First, it considered whether Crane was a proper party to
complain of non-disclosure of the trading scheme since it did not rely
on the non-disclosure. The court held, quoting from Vine: "What must
be shown is that there was deception which misled [other] stockholders
and that this was in fact the cause of plaintiff's claimed injury ' 42 and
then proceeded to discuss the purchaser-seller limitation:
Although this court adhered to a fairly strict construction of the
purchaser-seller requirement in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel
Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 343 U.S. 956, 72
S. Ct. 1051, 96 L. Ed. 1356 (1952), and in Iroquois Industries,
forced seller of the newly issued Standard convertible preferred under threat of a
divestiture action to be brought by Standard under the antitrust laws.
Crane Company v. Westinghouse Air Brake Company, 419 F.2d 787,798 (1969).
But the court continues:
Thus, we have here in Crane one induced to sell by Standard's deception and
manipulation and so within the protection of section 9(a) (2). Moreover, even if a
narrower view were taken of section 9(a) (2), it would seem that Standard's
conduct would still be actionable under Rule lob-5(c), condemning conduct
which operates as a fraud or deceit "upon any person."
The purchase-sale requirement must be interpreted so that the broad design of
the Exchange Act, to prevent inequitable and unfair practices on securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets, is not frustrated by the use of novel or
atypical transactions. A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, supra, 375 F.2d at 397 (footnotes
omitted).
Crane at 798.
40. Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Company, 419 F.2d 787,795-96 (1969).
41. Id. at 796.
42. Id. at 797.
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Inc. v. Sycracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir., Nov. 3,
1969), there was in Birnbaum no indication of a causal connection between the alleged violation of Rule 10b-5 and the injury
to the corporation and its shareholders. The requirement has
been interpreted fairly broadly in cases since Birnbaum. In
Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir.
1967), we held that shareholders of a corporation had standing
under Rule 10b-5 to obtain injunctive relief to prevent controlling persons from depressing the price of the corporation's
stock by market manipulation, even though the complaining
shareholders had purchased their shares prior to the manipulation and had not yet sold them. The damage claim was dismissed
for lack of a causal connection, id. at 547.... In damage action,
this court in Symington Wayne Corp. v. Dresser Industries, Inc.,
383 F.2d 840, 842 (2d Cir. 1967), referred to the decisions in
A.T. Brod & Co. v. Perlow, supra, and Vine v. Beneficial Finance Co., supra, as having "expressly left undecided the question whether one who is neither a purchaser nor a seller can
attack a transaction under Rule 10b-5." Iroquois declined to allow relief in a tender offer situation where plaintiff was neither
a purchaser nor a seller. 3
To be sure, the court viewed the absence of "purchaser" or "seller"
status as an aspect of the problem of demonstrating causation. Moreover, it seems that the court allowed a claim for damages or recission
by a plaintiff who was neither a "purchaser" nor a "seller." Furthermore,
the court never designated whether this right to damages arose under
rule 10b-5 and not solely under § 9(a). 4 However, the court noted that
Crane's rights under rule 10b-5 existed even if § 9(a) (2) were narrowly
construed. 45 In any case, his rights under 10b-5 should not be construed
to include only prospective injunctive relief as such relief would have
been practically futile since at the time of the suit, Crane's tender offer
had been defeated; the Standard-Air Brake merger consummated; and
Crane had already disposed of all but 1,000 of its 740,311 shares of
Standard convertible preferred.
The possible ramifications of Crane were vividly expressed by the
Third Circuit in Kahan v. Rosenstiel4 6 wherein the court stated that
"Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Company ...makes it clear that
there is no longer a per se requirement that plaintiff's in a 10(b) suit
Kahan involved a petition for
be defrauded purchasers or sellers ...
legal fees arising out of a prior 10b-5 suit. In the suit giving rise to the
legal fees, the plaintiff, a non-tendering shareholder of Schenley claimed
that Rosenstiel, the controlling stockholder, sold his interest to Glen
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 797-98 (footnotes omitted).
See note 35 supra.
See note 39 supra.
424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970).
Id. at 171.
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Alden for a premium only after he terminated merger negotiations with
P. Lorillard on terms more favorable to the minority stockholders because they refused to pay him a premium. The plaintiff also alleged that
when Glen Alden made a tender offer to the minority stockholders of
Schenley, they both omitted to disclose this lost opportunity and falsely
represented that the offer to the stockholders was equal or comparable
to the price per share paid to Rosenstiel.
In the action for legal fees, the plaintiff alleged that as a result of
his legal action, Glen Alden increased its offer creating a fund of approximately $83,000,000 for the class he represented, based upon the
difference between the value of the original offer and the final tender
offer. The district court dismissed plaintiff's petition on the grounds
that: the plaintiff had not filed a meritorious damage action which could
survive a motion to dismiss, because he was not a purchaser or seller
and because he failed to allege reliance on the deception; the plaintiff
failed to establish a proper class action, or benefit to the class; and the
plaintiff sought counsel fees from the defendants rather than from a
fund created by his efforts.48 Upon each of these grounds, the Third
Circuit reversed and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 49 In finding
that the plaintiff had standing to sue under rule lOb-5 despite the fact
that he did not tender his stock, the court relied primarily on Crane and
the emphasis on causation enunciated therein. Moreover, the court
specifically rejected the defendants' contention that Crane was decided
on the "forced seller theory" developed in Vine v. Beneficial Finance
Co.5" In addition, the Kahan case quoted with approval from Butler
Aviation International,Inc. v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc.,51 wherein
Judge Cannella of the Southern District of New York stated:
[I]t is not required under Rule lOb-5 that plaintiff be a buyer
or seller of stock as those terms are normally understood. The
phrase "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security"
was intended by Congress to mean only "that the device employed, whatever it might be, be of a sort that would cause reasonable investors to rely thereon, and, in connection therewith,
so relying, cause them to purchase or sell a corporation's securities. [SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d 833 at 860 (2d
Cir. 1968)]. See Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co.52
While Kahan undoubtedly rejects a strict purchaser-seller requirement in cases involving injunctive relief, it does not resolve the question
of whether the fact that a plaintiff is neither a "purchaser" nor "seller"
precludes him, as a matter of law, from demonstrating sufficient causal
48. Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 300 F. Supp. 447 (D. Del. 1969).
49. Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970).
50. Id. at 172.
51. 307 F. Supp. 910 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, (without passing on the question of
standing rule 10b-5) 425 F.2d 842, n.1 (2d Cir. 1970).
52. Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 172 (3d Cir. 1970).
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connection between his injury and the alleged violation. This follows
since the court chose to distinguish Birnbaum and Iroquois on the ground
that they involved damage suits.53
Another interesting facet of Kahan involves the fact that the plaintiff's complaint in the 10b-5 suit did not specifically ask for injunctive
relief; it contained only the general request for "further relief as may be
just." Nevertheless, the court found that the plaintiff had standing to bring
the suit because a federal court empowered to award any relief appropriate
under the circumstances 4 would not have dismissed so long as a cause
of action for injunctive relief were inherent in the complaint." While this
position allows standing to those who neglect or fail to recognize their
right to equitable relief, it also implies that absent a claim for injunctive
or, in any case, equitable relief, one who is not a "purchaser" or "seller"
cannot, as a matter of law, demonstrate the necessary connection between the violation and the injury to sue under rule 10b-5.
This compulsion to uphold the Birnbaum requirement in damage
actions is evident in the recent decision of the Fifth Circuit, Rekant v.
Desser."6 In Rekant, the court upheld a derivative action upon finding
that the corporation was a "seller" for the purposes of rule 10b-5. 5 7 The
court disposed of the individual and class actions without reaching the
question of whether the decision to hold, rather than to buy or sell, is
sufficient to give rise to a cause of action under rule 10b-5. 58 Nonetheless,
the court added by way of vigorous dictum that "Birnbaum still stands."5 9
Yet even the Rekant court recognized that the purchaser-seller requirement was not absolute and that the distinguishing factor in damage
suits denying standing to "non-purchasers" or "non-sellers" was the inability of the plaintiffs to show a causal connection between the loss and
the violation.
The cases professedly disallowing a federal action under § 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 for corporate mismanagement may perhaps be
distinguished on the issue of causation. In Birnbaum, the corporation was not a direct party to the allegedly fraudulent transaction; the president of Newport Steel, in his official capacity,
rejected a merger proposal from Follansbee Steel, and instead
personally sold his control block of Newport stock to Follansbee at a substantial profit. Similarly in the private-damage cases,
53. Id. at 171.
54. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(c).
55. Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 174 (3d Cir. 1970).
56. 425 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1970).
57. Id. at 877.
58. Id. It is interesting that this court, which so vigorously defended Birnbaum, appeared
extremely reluctant to decide whether the decision to hold, i.e., a decision not to sell, could
give rise to a cause of action under rule 10b-5. The court, quite properly, avoided this
issue, but only after withholding ruling on the case for over one year after receiving briefs
and hearing oral arguments during which period it called upon the Securities and Exchange
Commission to file an amicus brief on this very question.
59. The dictum referred to is quoted on p. 134 supra.
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such as Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, Inc., 2 Cir. 1967, 384
F.2d 540, there was no direct-dealing between the plaintiff and
the perpetrator of the alleged fraudulent stock transaction. The
hesitancy of courts to grant a cause of action under Rule lOb-5
when the causal connection between the fraud and the injury is
not readily apparent, as when there is no direct-dealing between
the parties, may explain in part, at least, the diverse results. See
Commerce Reporting Co. v. Puretec, Inc., S.D.N.Y. 1968, 290
F. Supp. 715.60
V.

CONCLUSION

By treating the absence of purchaser or seller status as only an element in the problem of demonstrating causation between the alleged
fraud and the injury, the three cases, Crane, Kahan and Rekant, should
impliedly reverse Birnbaum.
The Birnbaum court concluded that § 10(b) was added to the securities laws merely to provide a remedy for defrauded sellers comparable to that provided for defrauded buyers by § 17 of the 1933 Act and
that despite the use of the words "any person ... in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities," Congress intended to afford protection
only to "purchasers" or "sellers."
These three cases, properly read, express the view that Congress
intended to provide a remedy to anyone connected with a securities transaction who could demonstrate that the alleged fraud caused him injury.
However, to say that they have reversed Birnbaum is at best premature. 6'
While their reasoning should not be reconciled with Birnbaum, they consistently express continued admiration for that decision.6" Perhaps these
expressions of admiration should be considered more as a monument to
the ability of lawyers to hypnotize themselves with their own creations
60. Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1970).
61. The treatment of Birnbaum varies both among and within the circuits. See
Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872 (5th Cir. 1970); Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3d
Cir. 1970) ; City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir. 1970) ; Iroquois Indus.,
Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969); Britt v. Cyril Bath Co., 417
F.2d 433 (6th Cir. 1969); Greenstein v. Paul, 400 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1968); Dasho v.
Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1967); Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378
F.2d 783 (8th Cir. 1967); Norsul Oil & Mining, Ltd. v. Texaco, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 1242
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); Stedman v. Storer, 308 F. Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Butler Aviation
Int'l, Inc. v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 910 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 425
F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1970); Coffee v. Permian, 306 F. Supp. 1371 (N.D. Tex. 1969) rev'd
434 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1970). Commerce Reporting Co. v. Puretec, Inc., 290 F. Supp. 715
(S.D.N.Y. 1968). Moreover, the Supreme Court has consistently avoided questions involving
the purchaser-seller requirement. See, e.g., Nat'l Sec., Inc. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 393 U.S.
453, 467 & n.9 (1969). In this past session the Court has denied certiorari in the following
cases: Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 90 S. Ct. 2199 (1970); Vanderboom
v. City Nat'l Bank, 90 S. Ct. 2196 (1970); Glen Alden Corp. v. Kahan, 90 S. Ct. 1870
(1970).
62. See e.g., Rekant v. Desser, 425 F.2d 872, 877 (5th Cir. 1970): "Bloody but unbowed, Birnbaum still stands...."
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than as an agreement with the Birnbaum interpretation of Congressional
intent. In any case, they cannot be disregarded. 3
To be sure, there is no longer a strict purchaser-seller requirement
in cases involving injunctive relief. However, this may be viewed as
merely an exception to Birnbaum required by the fact that injunctive
relief is generally sought before the purchase or sale is consummated. So
long as Congress intended to allow private suits for injunctions, it could
not have intended to provide this remedy only to the "purchaser" or
"seller." Whether this is an exception to Birnbaum or evidence of the
fallacy of Birnbaum is the question these cases fail to resolve. Kahan and
Rekant attempt to walk the tightrope. Both these courts apparently
reject the idea that Congress intended to afford a remedy only to the
purchaser or seller but achieve the result in Birnbaum by treating the
absence of purchaser-seller status as an absolute bar, as a matter of law,
to establishing the necessary correlation between the alleged violation
and the loss in actions seeking other than injunctive relief. To date, only
the Crane court has allowed a claim for rescission and damages when
the plaintiff was neither a "purchaser" nor a "seller.""4
While the reasoning employed by each of these decisions supports
the elimination of a per se purchaser-seller requirement, the courts seem
reluctant to abandon Birnbaum, especially in damage actions. The best
the opponents of Birnbaum can say is that in these cases Birnbaum has
been reversed and revered.
63. Though not raised in any cases involving the "Birnbaum rule," a strong argument
can be made for the proposition that courts should not, absent exceptional circumstances,
re-examine, after the passage of time, decisions resolving Congressional intent. See Boys
Mrkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerk's Union, Local 770, 90 S. Ct. 1583 (1970) (dissenting opinion,
Black, J.) wherein Justice Black argues that when courts alter important provisions of
statutes years later simply because the judges have changed, they usurp a proper function
of the legislature.
64. See discussion of Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir.
1969), p. 138 supra.

